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ABSTRACT
The  local  academic  science  base  plays  a  dominant  role  in  determining  where and when
biotechnology is adopted by existing firms or -- much more frequently -- exploited by new entrants in the
U.S.  In Japan this new dominant technology has almost exclusively been introduced through organizational
change in existing firms.  We show that for the U.S. and global pharmaceutical business -- biotechnology's
most important application -- the performance enhancement associated with this organizational change is
necessary for incumbent firms to remain competitive and, ultimately, to survive.  Japan's sharply higher
organizational change/new entry ratio compared to the U.S. during the biotech revolution is related to
Japan's relatively compact geography and institutional differences between the higher-education and
research funding systems, the venture-capital and IPO markets, cultural characteristics and incentive
systems which impact scientists' entrepreneurialism, and tort-liability exposures.  Both local science base
and pre-existing economic activity explained where and when Japanese firms adopted biotechnology, with
the latter playing a somewhat larger role.  De nova entry was determined similarly as if entry and
organizational change are alternative ways of exploiting the scientific base with relative frequency reflecting
underlying institutions.  While similar processes are at work in Japan and America, stars in Japan induce
entry or transformation of significantly fewer firms than in the U.S. and preexisting economic activity plays
a greater role.  We find no such significant difference for entry of keiretsu-member and nonmember firms
within Japan.
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Local Academic Science Driving Organizational Change:
The Adoption of Biotechnology by Japanese Firms
by Michael R. Darby and Lynne G. Zucker
Geographically localized knowledge -- especially academic-derived knowledge -- plays a
major role in the geographic distribution of American industry.
1  In the United States, professors are
often involved in start-up firms, but Japanese institutions discussed below largely precluded this role
during the biotechnological revolution in Japan.  Even significant consulting relationships with incumbent
firms were difficult or illegal for Japanese professors.  This paper shows that, nonetheless, the local
availability of the best academic scientists remains an important determinant of the speed with which
existing firms adopted the new dominant technology, although the magnitude of the effect is less than in
the U.S.
Adoption of modern biotechnology requires profound organizational change in the R&D
function and is necessary for performance improvement or even survival in industries in which
competitors are adopting the new dominant technology.  Biotechnology is best understood as an
"invention of a method of inventing" analogous to the development of hybrid-seed technology ( Zvi
Griliches 1957).  In most applications (genetic engineering), genes from one organism are inserted in
cells from another organism (of the same or different species) and the resulting new organism is grown
and reproduced.  Thus, biotechnology can "merely" increase the  speed and precision of traditional
cross-breeding or produce more novel life forms such as, for example, easy-to-grow bacteria which
produce human insulin.
These invented organisms or their products may serve directly as inputs into the productive
process (as in pharmaceuticals, food, beer, and other fermentation-based products) or serve as R&D
tools (e.g., producing particular receptors as targets to identify promising drug candidates in
pharmaceutical discovery).  For firms whose profits depend on discovery of new and better drugs,2
seeds, yeasts, and the like, adoption of modern biotechnology often required a profound change in
power relations and relevant scientific base.  For example, pre-biotech drug discovery was dominated
by chemists at both bench and managerial levels with biological sciences playing a subsidiary role at
best.  Adoption of biotechnology at a major U.S. pharmaceutical firm entailed massive hiring of
outstanding biological scientists for both functions and forcing out over a short time those scientists --
whose prior discoveries were paying for the new hires -- who could not work effectively with the new
technology (Zucker and Darby 1997, pp. 435-436).  Thus, adoption of biotechnology by an existing
firm simultaneously represented and required radical organizational change to obtain the performance
improvement which could provide ongoing competitive advantage in some industries or, in other
industries, avoid ongoing competitive disadvantage and ultimately exit.
Section I demonstrates quantitatively the major performance-enhancing significance of the
radical organizational change inherent in adoption of biotechnology to incumbent-firm survival in the
U.S. and global pharmaceutical industry, the new technology's most important area of application to
date.  Section II reports findings of extensive Japanese fieldwork which identified institutional differences
between Japan and the United States which have promoted Japanese organizational change relative to
replacement of existing firms by new firms in comparison to the U.S.  In Section III, we show that the
timing and location of these organizational changes appear to be driven by the prior development of a
local science base -- measured by publications of outstanding "star" bioscientists in local universities --
as opposed to simply reflecting the prior distribution of economic activity.  Section IV examines the
relative importance of local science base to organizational change in existing firms and entry of new firms
attempting to use the new technology to capture market share from the existing firms.  Keiretsus have
played a significant role in the Japanese economy; we examine whether keiretsu membership promoted
or retarded this form of organizational change in Section V.  Section VI examines the relative
importance of local science base to organizational change in existing firms and entry of new firms in3
Japan versus in the United States.  We summarize our results and draw conclusions in Section VII.  An
extensive Data Appendix completes the paper.
I.  The Performance-Enhancing Significance of Adopting Biotechnology:  Survival
Michael L.  Tushman and Philip Anderson (1986) have argued that major technological
discontinuities originating outside the established industry are threatening to the incumbents, who
thereafter often exit, unable to keep up with the new technology outside the scope of their knowledge. 
Indeed, Rebecca Henderson (1993) has pointed to "Underinvestment and Incompetence as Responses
to Radical Innovation" by incumbent firms.  Examining the pharmaceutical industry, Zucker and Darby
(1996a, 1997) have argued that while there is support for this pessimistic view of the survival of
incumbents faced with an external technological breakthrough, a sizable number of these firms have
been able to successfully transform their methodology of drug discovery to the point that they are in that
regard difficult to distinguish from the most successful dedicated biotechnology firms.  In this section, we
present new evidence of the substantial performance-enhancing significance of adopting biotechnology
in terms of increased probability of survival of the firm.
Major pharmaceutical firms carry out five distinct, important activities:  drug discovery, clinical
testing, obtaining regulatory approval, manufacturing drugs, and marketing drugs.  Biotechnology
profoundly alters drug discovery and may affect manufacturing as well.  An industry leader will perform
all these activities well, but there is little scope for the other activities if drug discovery is not done well. 
Indeed membership in the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ( PhRMA --
formerly known as Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association or PMA) requires an active program of
drug discovery.
2  Since biotechnology has dramatically increased the productivity of drug discovery
activities by replacing more or less random screening of compounds with cloned targets, smart drug4
design, and other advances, we expect that the probability a firm will survive the radical restructuring of
the industry in response to the innovation depends on the degree to which it has successfully adopted
the new technology.
We operationalize our measure of adoption of biotechnology by examining whether any of the
firm's scientific publications are authored by a "star scientist" writing either as or with an employee of the
firm.  We use star scientists to mean one of the 327 top-producing genetic sequence discoverers
identified and validated for biotechnology entry or adoption and for subsequent firm success in Zucker,
Darby, and Brewer (1998) and Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998).  We assume based on our prior
field work that any major pharmaceutical firm which has converted its drug discovery has the resources
to identify and hire or at least work with one of the top scientists in the field at the bench level.
Our principal survival test is based on the 38 members of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association in 1975 for which we could find CUSIP numbers either for themselves or their ultimate
parent.  The founding discovery for biotechnology was made by Cohen and Boyer in 1973 and the first
firms began to use biotechnology in 1975 or 1976; so this list provides a reasonable basis for identifying
the incumbent firms at the time of the technological discontinuity.  Essentially all these firms applied
chemistry-based drug-discovery technologies in 1975.  Fifteen of these 38 firms survived in the sense
that the firm continued to 1999 as an independent firm (or division or subsidiary of the 1975 parent) or
the dominant partner in any merger.  There is a slight ambiguity in how to treat the Upjohn case which
entered into an equal merger with Pharmacia of Sweden to form Pharmacia and Upjohn, but we count
this as a clear survival case since the merged company is in the process of moving its global
headquarters from "neutral" London to New Jersey.
As indicated in the first three lines of panel A of Table 1, only 16 or 42.1 percent of these 38
firms have survived the past 24 years.  However, among firms adopting biotechnology to the extent of
developing star ties, 12 or 80.0 percent of 15 adopting firms survived, while only 4 or 17.4 percent of5
the 23 firms without ties managed to survive.  The c c
2(1) statistic for the hypothesis that the difference in
survival rates is due to chance is 14.6 implying a p-value much less than  0.001.  Thus it appears that
adoption of biotechnology was so performance-enhancing in drug discovery that non-adopters were
effectively forced from the field by adopting incumbents (and new entrant dedicated biotechnology
firms).
George Baker has argued that this apparently strong finding could be the spurious result of two
independent processes in which those that happen to survive longer will have more years in which their
scientists might write in collaboration with a star scientist.  This hypothesis is not borne out by the data,
however.  The fourth and fifth lines of panel A show that the average exit rate per year for firms which
do not then have star ties is double that for firms that have then written with stars.  Annual observations
on exit rates -- the ratio of firms exiting in the year to their numbers at the beginning of the year -- are
plotted in Figure 1 according to whether the firm did or did not have any prior star ties at the beginning
of the year in question.  We note that the exit rate of firms with ties exceeded the exit rate of firms
without ties in only one year, and is generally much smaller. The significance level of this difference in
mean exit rates depends on the dating of the ties:  by year of publication or, as we have argued
elsewhere (Zucker and Darby 1996b), some two (or more) years earlier when the work was actually
done and the firm must have already adopted biotech drug discovery.  Even allowing for a two year
publication lag, which reduces (increases) the per year exit rate for firms with (without) star ties by
increasing (decreasing) the number of years in the denominator, the significance level for a one-sided
difference in means test is only 0.06.
Fortunately, we can obtain more precise estimates of the effects on firm survival of biotech
adaption as indicated by star ties by estimating  Weibull  loglinear survival models.
3  In the results
reported in Table 2, the two variables considered to effect the survival probability are whether the firm
in the current year is marked as adopting biotechnology by having worked with a star and whether the6
firm was listed as among the top 20 firms in the world in terms of drug discovery in 1981-1982
(discussed below).  Regardless of whether the Top-20 variable is included in the model and regardless
of whether a two or zero year publication lag is assumed, the probability of survival is increased at
better than the 0.05 significance level in years in which Has-ties marks the firm as having adopted
biotechnology.
We also examined the survival of the world's 20 leading companies in the development of new
drugs in 1981-1982 as identified by the California Department of Commerce (1986), extending our
previous analysis of these firms in Zucker and Darby (1996a).  This set of firms has the advantage of
being international (9 American based, 1 British, 2 French, 3 German, 2 Japanese, and 3 Swiss) but the
disadvantage that most (70 percent) of these outstanding, science-based firms did adopt biotechnology
(as indicated by star ties) and 90 percent of these 20 firms survived from 1982 to 1999.  Fortunately,
since sample size and the rarity of exit prevented our obtaining stable Weibull estimates, the Baker
argument does not apply in this case:  All the firms that were ever tied to a star had published results
with stars by 1992, indicating adoption likely occurred at the latest in 1990; the two exits occurred in
1995 and 1996, long after all the firms we count as adopting biotech drug discovery had done so. 
Although the significance of the difference in means tests is a bit shy of conventional levels, we can rely
on the contingency table c c
2 test to reject at the 0.025 level the hypothesis that prior adoption of biotech
drug discovery did not affect survival.
4
We conclude that the quantitative evidence supports the everyday observation of industry
experts such as Dr. Francois L'Eplattanier (in 1995 as head of R&D for Ciba of Switzerland):  "Genetic
engineering is absolutely essential for us.  If we were not active in genetic engineering, we would be out
of the game entirely by the beginning of the next century."
5  So far, eighty three percent of the 23 PMA
members of 1975 which we identified as failing to adopt biotechnology successfully have exited with
one and three quarters year left until 2001.7
II.  Why Did the Japanese Biotech Revolution Occur via Organizational Change?
Over 1993-1998 we have done fieldwork involving interviews with nearly 100 university and
research-institute scientists, executives and scientists at Japanese biotech and financial firms, and
government officials.  The purpose of the fieldwork was to better understand the industry and its
constraints in order to develop hypotheses for quantitative analysis, not to test any hypotheses per se.
Our respondents identified a number of structural differences between Japan and the United
States, differences which they primarily saw as impediments on the Japanese side explaining the lag of
their industry behind that in the U.S.  (A particularly well organized version of the consensus Japanese
view was provided for use in our discussions by one of our respondents and appears as Appendix
Table A.)  From our reading and observations, we have identified several other factors that may affect
the process of entry of new firms and adoption by incumbent firms.  We shall discuss what appear to be
the key underlying differences after summarizing what is known about the industry and its scientific base
in the two countries.
Science Base and Its Commercial Application
As indicated previously, there is a unified data base (GenBank) reporting all genetic-sequence
discoveries.  The  GenBank accession number is normally required by editors as a condition of
publication, and scientific and commercial incentives for demonstrated priority ensure that scientists
promptly report their discoveries.
6  There is no such universe to provide a frame for identifying the firms
exploiting the new biotechnology by commercially applying the breakthroughs in recombinant DNA and
other basic technologies.  In our terminology, biotech-using firms are either newly-formed "entrants" or
pre-existing "incumbents".  Depending on the directory or directories a researcher uses, for example,8
there are between 500 and perhaps 2500 biotech-using firms in the U.S. alone.  Using a more stringent
definition of whether the enterprise is actually involved in using the breakthrough technologies, Zucker,
Darby, and Brewer (1998) dated the inception of 751 U.S. biotech-using firms from 1976 to April
1990.  As used here "inception" refers to the formation of biotech-using entrants and the initial adoption
of biotechnology by incumbents.  For larger incumbents, this initial adoption of biotechnology frequently
occurs in particular identifiable subunits or subsidiaries -- the proverbial "skunk-works."
We have attempted to apply a similar definition to biotech-using firms in Japan, and have
identified 368 biotech-using firms either born or beginning use of biotechnology between 1975 and
1989 inclusive as described in Data Appendix A.1. We are not confident that the definitions are strictly
comparable, nor is a simple count of biotech-using firms our preferred measure of the total activity in the
area.  Unfortunately, however, many entrants are nonpublic and report very little information while most
incumbents do not report information with sufficient detail to distinguish between activities involving
traditional technologies and the new biotechnologies. 
In the U.S. data, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) could definitively classify only 661 of their
751 biotech-using firms, 511 as entrants and 150 as incumbents, with the remaining 90 biotech-using
firms lacking data to classify or (in 18 cases) being problematic joint venture cases.  For Japan we did
not have the ability to definitively investigate the origins of entrants and adopted a convention which we
believe overstates the frequency of true de nova entry and accordingly understates the frequency of
adoption of biotechnology by incumbent firms:  Any biotech-using company with a founding date after
1974 is counted as an entrant while any company with an earlier founding date is counted as an
incumbent.  On this basis we count 23 Japanese entrants and 345 incumbents.  Thus, only 6.3 percent
of Japanese biotech-using firms are entrants compared to 77.3 percent (511/661) in the U.S.  Based on
our fieldwork, we believe that most of these Japanese entrants are unidentified affiliates of incumbents or
groups of incumbents and that essentially all inceptions in Japan amount to organizational changes in9
incumbent firms rather than true entry.
7
Figures 2 and 3 plot the number of stars ever active and the number of biotech-using firms born
up to early 1990 by the functional economic areas defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (for
short, "BEAs") for the U.S. and by prefectures for Japan.
8  We see in both the U.S. and Japan that
there is a high correlation in the locations of biotech-using firms and star scientists.  Of course, this
apparent correlation cannot prove causation since it may reflect the effects on each of third factors such
as population or employment distribution which might determine where both stars and biotech-using
firms are located.
Geography
The U.S. is characterized by a rich variety of patterns across the BEAs:  Some large areas have
great universities and others do not, the same is true for medium and smaller regions.  Nor do all great
universities, even those among the strongest in the biosciences, have similar numbers of star scientists as
we define them.  All together, the U.S. geography provides us with sufficient variation to characterize as
a natural experiment.  In Japan, people, firms, and universities are much more concentrated, particularly
in the Tokyo area and around Osaka and Kyoto in the Kansai.  This makes it more difficult statistically
to distinguish the effects of stars and other measures of intellectual human capital from measures of
economic activity.  Fortunately, we do have information not only on where stars have been active but
also when and thus are able to draw some conclusions where otherwise it might be impossible.
The simple map in Figure 3 illustrates in a substantive as well as statistical way in which Japan's
geography might result in different impacts of local stars on regional development:  With the population
and economy concentrated like a dumbbell along the Tokaido shinkansen line, few stars are located
more than three hours from some 90 percent of the existing firms.  Thus, it is conceivable that Kyoto's
scientists could contribute actively to commercial applications of biotechnology at biotech-using firms10
located in Tokyo and vice versa.  These issues are particularly important in explaining inception into
biotechnology.  Once we know the firms which are actively using the new technology, we can look at
specific linkages between stars and biotech-using firms to predict the success of those biotech-using
firms (see Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 1998), but that is the subject of another paper.
Institutional and Cultural Differences between Japan and the United States
As noted above, interview respondents acutely sense that Japan has lagged behind the United
States in creating and commercially applying their scientific base.  They point to three main areas of
concern:  (a) university structure, policies, and culture, (b) financial market support for venture firms,
and (c) cultural differences with respect to entrepreneurialism.  We would add that Japanese firms have
faced a distinctly lower threat of product liability litigation.
University structure, policies, and culture
Japanese  respondents point to the  hierarchal nature of Japanese universities with funding,
personnel, and laboratory space primarily allocated equally to each professor regardless of their current
or prospective research productivity as retarding the development of the scientific base.  They also note
that it is illegal for national university professors, where essentially all the stars are located, to earn
additional labor income from firms or start a firm as is common in the U.S.  However, a number of
respondents noted that those laws are widely evaded, ignored or otherwise worked around, but the less
secure property rights for professor-firm collaborations may interfere with their effectiveness. 
Furthermore, cultural inhibitions on professor's entrepreneurial activity were said to reinforce the legal
bans on profiting from consulting with or starting a firm.
A significant difference in treatment of patent rights between Japan and the U.S. is an important
institutional factor favoring more Japanese star-firm ties.  In the U.S., if the underlying work is done at a11
professor's university laboratory, a patent is normally assigned to the university although the inventing
scientist(s) may have significant shares of any income from the patent.  In Japan, such a patent is almost
always assigned to the inventing scientist(s) who may make a donation to his university or department.
9 
Furthermore, top researchers sent (with funds for equipment and supplies) to stars' university
laboratories by firms as "students" are an important means of increasing the size of the laboratory since
professors cannot use research grants to increase staff because of lifetime employment at the
universities.  Thus, in Japan star-firm joint work is customarily done in the star's university laboratory
while in the U.S. a star must physically go to a firm laboratory and establish a second team there to
secure full patent rights.
These latter advantages apparently more than offset the deterrents to working with firms, and
Japanese academic scientists do so to a remarkable degree.  In fact, 40 percent of Japanese stars at
some time in their publishing career up to 1990 either have published as or (much more frequently) with
an employee of a firm, a higher rate even than the 33 percent figure for the United States.  Stars in
Japan and the U.S. show substantially more such ties than those in any other country.
10  While the
quantity of collaborations between academic scientists and firms if anything favors Japan, it may be that
these ties are not as deep or significant to the firm as in the U.S. where the scientists are frequently
motivated by substantial equity interests in the firms with which they work.
Financial market support for venture firms
There are about 1.3 million corporations active in Japan, which is nearly  three quarters the
American rate of 3.5 million after adjustment for population differences.  Despite the special deterrents
to starting biotech firms for reasons of university policy and cultural inhibitions (discussed below), clearly
some Japanese are willing and able to start businesses.
Respondents attribute the capital market inhibitions to creation of venture firms as due to the
interaction of four distinct but reinforcing attributes of these markets:  the lack of American-style venture12
capital firms, the prohibition of initial public offerings (IPOs) for firms without an established record of
substantial profitability, the fact that the keiretsu will not buy small firms unless at distress prices, and the
lack of bank financing for risky ventures without collateral.
About 120 venture capital firms exist in Japan, but they are all focussed in bringing established
small and medium sized companies to the point of making the IPO.  These firms had assets of about
$5.5 billion by May 1993 with another $2.5 billion raised through sponsored partnerships.  The largest
of these venture capital firms by far is Japan Associated Finance Co., Ltd. (JAFCO) with about $2
billion under management.  However, there appear to be no U.S. style venture capital firms which will
finance a new biotech firm located in Japan for the first ten years or so before the firm either makes an
IPO or is sold profitably to a large firm.
11
The lack of venture capital firms financing start-up companies does not appear to reflect a
shorter horizon on the part of venture capital firms in Japan.  In the United States, too, a typical venture
capital firm is looking to something like a ten year relationship.  The difference is that American firms can
rely on making an IPO or profitable sale at a much earlier stage of development than in Japan.  In effect,
the more complete American capital markets allow the venture capital firms to act farsighted because
they know that once substantial research and development results have been obtained, their investments
can be sold to other investors who will discount the future profitability to the present.
12
The Japanese capital markets and especially the Ministry of Finance did not accept IPOs for
firms which do not have a track record of proven profitability.  The second section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange for smaller companies requires a minimum before tax profit of ¥400 million ($3.6 million). 
On the over-the-counter (OTC) market JASDAQ which began on October 23, 1991, the smallest
before tax profit reported by a firm making an IPO was ¥258 million ($2.3 million).
13  Only in 1995
under pressure from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), was a second OTC
market established to permit high-technology companies without proven profits to go public, but the first13
such IPO did not occur until 1996 (for an intranet software firm ATL Systems Inc.) and even in 1999
there are only one or two true venture biotech firms in Japan.  Thus a Japanese IPO market which could
take biotech venture firms public before profitability is only now emerging and its absence in the 1970s,
1980s, and most of the 1990s, meant that there was no venture capital firms financing start-ups in the
golden age for biotech during the 1980s.  In this way we see a vicious circle of no financing for start-ups
and no start-ups to lead the way as with the Genentech IPO in the U.S. in 1982.
In principle, the large groups of Japanese companies (the keiretsus) could substitute for an
effective IPO market by bidding vigorously for the winners of an R&D race among independent venture
firms.  Indeed, this is a common outcome of successful venture capital investments in the United States. 
For reasons that are not clear to the authors, none of the respondents reported any such bidding and
indeed indicated that if firms were bought, it would be only at distress prices.
14  Thus, one alternative
means of fostering bio-ventures in Japan was eliminated.
Respondents also point to a lack of  uncollateralized bank financing for risky ventures as a
deterrent to growth in new enterprises, in effect requiring all growth to be self-financed.  While this
would seem to stretch out the period of growth relative to other countries, it seems unlikely to us that
bank financing would anywhere be a real alternative to venture capital firms.
Japanese venture capital firms such as JAFCO have concentrated on financing American and
European bio-ventures and also on their strategic alliances with Japanese firms through joint ventures
and other mechanisms.
Cultural differences with respect to entrepreneurialism
As alluded to above, many respondents commented on the differential status or honor given to
the professor relative to the individual involved in commerce.  This social distance was compounded at
least through the early eighties by the radical or Marxist orientation of many students and some faculty in
the major universities.14
Several respondents also believed that business people do not want to reveal too much to
university faculty because the faculty highly value open communication and may not keep their findings
confidential until patent protection of intellectual property can be obtained.
One respondent went so far as to say that firms looked to the universities primarily to supply
good Japanese brains.  The demand for Japanese scientists, rather than scientists trained elsewhere,
probably stems in part from the value of the social network formed in the universities, providing early
and privileged access to new discoveries at the university where the scientist was trained.  But there also
may be an element of Japanese discrimination against gaijin (foreigners) that leads firms to avoid hiring
non-Japanese whether because of prejudice or for fear that the foreigners will ultimately choose to leave
Japan and the firm.
Other respondents suggested that the faculty's desire for honor and only covert relations with
firms reduced the firms' costs of obtaining Japanese academic research -- that providing honor through
creating foundations and institutes and perhaps making some informally agreed payments cost only a
tenth as much as explicit payments for academic researchers in the U.S. and Europe.
15  On retirement
from the university, a professor who has maintained a close relationship with a company can become a
consultant to the firm or a member of its board -- but not an employee -- without losing honor.
A second cultural factor which inhibits the creation of bio-venture firms in Japan is the national
career ideal of working for a single employer until retirement.  Reinforcing this factor is the importance
of social contacts within organizations which make it hard for a newcomer to enter a firm from outside. 
Thus, leaving a firm or university to start a new firm involves disrupting that firm-based or university-
based social network and possibly labeling oneself as different if not unstable.  If the firms succeeds,
then there is probably a net gain on these dimensions to the individual, but biotechnology is inherently
risky with the prizes from a search for a new drug mainly going to whomever gets there first and can
raise enough capital along the way to keep the company afloat until there are some profits.  If the new15
venture ultimately fails, the founding scientists' career pattern is disrupted and it may be very hard to find
new lifetime employment or even to establish the social network within a new organization to be
successful.  Since lifetime employment is itself a culturally endorsed risk-avoidance strategy, the
downside risk of starting a new firm must seem enormous compared to scientists used to the American
system of employment often said to be based on the revolving door.
16
Compounding the difficulties of the potential venture firm are the general difficulties with entry of
new firms into the Japanese market place.  These barriers to entry are well known and have been the
subject of numerous international trade negotiations.  They work for natives in much the same way as
for foreigners and must deter biotech-using entrants as well.  On the other hand, since the biggest
returns are in the highly regulated pharmaceutical industry where track record and personal ties also play
a major role in the United States, this factor probably should not be unduly stressed.
A cultural preference for group or team activity as opposed to the American ideal of rugged
individualism may contribute to the relative evenness of allocation of funds within ranks at the national
universities and the aversion to differential rewards for differential performance.  The same cultural
preference may restrain vigorous national competitions for scientific grants and the associated culture of
scientific entrepreneurship which seems to be a short step away from starting a new firm in the United
States.  The Japanese government, nonetheless, is currently shifting national policy toward competitive,
peer-reviewed research funding.  Scientists in both countries, moreover, rely on the same mode of
scientific production:  the research team based in the laboratory of a distinguished senior scientist.  It
remains for us to see how these teams differ.
A final cultural trend in Japan is its eclecticism.  One respondent noted a tradition of Japan's
sending people to other countries to learn their best practices starting 1000 years ago with China. 
While the success of Japan in judging the best in foreign economies and cultures and incorporating it at
home -- often in improved form -- is legendary, it may also lead to overestimation of foreign superiority16
in areas of innovation.  We saw that Japanese firms and investors were eager to support the innovative
work done in America but less willing to support and rely on the unique breakthroughs of Japan's own
scientists.  Sometimes Japanese firms ended up licensing applied technologies from the United States
that were based on Japanese basic-science discoveries -- just the reverse of many American's fear of
another VCR!
Threat of product liability litigation
Although Japanese observers have not remarked on the threat of product liability litigation as
playing a role in the development of commercial applications of biotechnology, this may be because they
were searching for factors which have retarded that development in Japan relative to the United States. 
Clearly, product liability has been, in contrast, a favorable factor for inception of biotech-using firms in
Japan.
Viscusi and Moore (1993) demonstrate that higher liability exposure tends to reduce R&D
expenditures for innovative products, so this is a positive difference for adoption of biotechnology in
Japan.  However, higher liability exposure works differentially for large and small firms since the most
that can be forfeited (beyond insurance) is the value of the company itself.  The greater the potential
liability – as in the U.S. – the greater is the competitive advantage of carrying out risk innovation in small
rather than large firms.  So the liability difference reinforces the university, financial, and cultural
explanations of why biotech-using firms are much more likely to be incumbents in Japan than in the U.S.
Conclusions on Why the Japanese Biotech Revolution Occurred via Organizational Change
As a practical matter, the structure of the Japanese capital markets (particularly the inability of
firms without substantial accounting profits to go public) precluded the pattern of entrant formation seen
in the U.S. (see Kishimoto 1989 and Zucker and Darby 1994 for details).  At the same time, the
structure of the universities has greatly reduced the number of potential founding scientist-entrepreneurs.17
 Thus, we understand why inception into commercial application of biotechnology in Japan has occurred
nearly exclusively through adoption of the technology by pre-existing firms (incumbents).  An alternative
explanation is that the threat of product liability litigation was sufficiently severe in the U.S. that many
incumbent firms left the field open for new entrants.  In any case, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998)
show that in the U.S. the inception processes for entrants and incumbents are indistinguishable.  We do
not have sufficient numbers of Japanese entrants to make a similar comparison, but it appears likely that
the effects of differential numbers of incumbents and entrants, if any, are on the comparative success of
Japanese biotech-using firms and not on their total numbers.
17  We will explore the former issue in future
work and here restrict our concern to the latter.
The structural differences between Japan and the U.S. raise questions as to whether the
significant impact on biotech-using firm inception of where and when star scientists are publishing --
observed in the U.S. at the BEA level -- were also present in Japan and, if so, to the same extent. 
These questions are addressed in Sections III and IV below.  Industrial groups known as keiretsus play
a prominent role in Japanese industrial organization that is not present in the United States.  Their risk-
sharing and cross-financing aspects might have facilitated inception into biotechnology for  keiretsu
member firms compared to others, a possibility examined in Section V.
III.  The Local Science Base and
Where and When Japanese Firms Adopted Biotechnology
In this section we restrict our statistical analysis to incumbents -- firms already born as the
commercialization of biotechnology began in 1975.  We do so to examine a pure case, but will proceed
in Section IV to examine inception for all Japanese biotech firms.  Since we have already learned a great
deal about the process of biotech-using-firm inception in the United States, we follow Zucker, Darby,18
and Brewer (1998) to the extent possible given the availability of data and the problems of
multicollinearity which arise within the more limited geography of Japan where many of the explanatory
variables used in the U.S. are highly correlated.  Basically, we look to measures of intellectual capital
and to other economic variables to explain inception of firms, entering them in groups both to give an
idea of marginal contribution and stability of the prior coefficients.
Given the directory nature of our firm data sources, we were concerned whether the reported
locations were the primary sites where biotechnology was done or merely the headquarters of the firm. 
Accordingly, we searched the Science Citation Index for biotech-relevant publications by scientists at
each of the 368 Japanese biotech-using firms in order to correct instances in which corporate
headquarters rather than laboratory or plant locations were reported in our directory source.  Where
another location was reported on a plurality of these publications, we used that location for the firm
instead of the one in the directory.
18
Analogous to Zucker, Darby, Brewer (1998), our data are in panel form for each of the 47
Japanese prefectures for each of the years 1975-1989 for a total of 705 observations.  We are
attempting to explain counts of inceptions by biotechnology-using firms for each prefecture and year. 
Since there are many zeroes among these non-negative integers, we estimate poisson regressions using
LIMDEP (Version 7.0).
We measure intellectual capital both by counts of how many stars and their collaborators are
"active" in each prefecture in each year and also by the number of main professors and the total
resources for bioscience research institutes at major universities in the prefecture (see Data Appendix
A.2 for details).  As in the U.S., the economic variables are total employment in the prefecture as a
measure of its size and average earnings in the prefecture as a measure of the skill level of its labor force
(see Data Appendix A.3 for details).
19
The first column (a) of Table 3 estimates a simple model of inception of incumbent firms into19
biotechnology based on the numbers of active stars and collaborators by year and prefecture.  In Japan,
stars have a strong positive effect and collaborators have a significant negative effect.
20  As in the U.S.,
there appears to be a nonlinear relationship which is captured in the second column (b) of Table 3 by
adding the product of the number of stars and collaborators.  This eliminates the negative direct effect of
collaborators and instead the negative interaction coefficient suggests that the more new people to
whom the stars are teaching the new technology the less is the effect of the stars on inception into
biotechnology.  However, the significance of both collaborators and the star x collaborator interaction
term is unstable as the model is expanded to account for other resources in the area; so the influence of
collaborators may not be reliably determined from the limited geography of Japan.  We believe that
geography's limits on the variation in Japanese conditions is the most likely explanation, in part because
when we experimented with artificially limiting the U.S. inception analysis data set to only California
BEAs, we found that similar instability resulted.
The final column (e) of Table 3 presents the full model, in which stars (as always) have a
significantly positive effect on the probability of inception of biotech-using firms in the prefecture.  Total
employment and average earnings also have highly significant positive effects.  The coefficients of the
number of main professors and total research funding for bioscience labs in major university research
institutes are insignificant in the full model, in contrast to model (c) which includes all the intellectual
human capital variables only and in which they are both significant but have the wrong sign.  We
explored the multicollinearity among these two variables and the economic variables a bit further by
dropping each in turn from models (c) and (e):  We found that either the number of main professors or
total research funding is highly significant and positive in model (c) if entered alone but neither is
significant if entered alone in model (e) with the economic variables.  Thus, the distribution of major
universities is such that, unlike the U.S., we cannot find any stable effect for them separate from the
areas in which they are located.20
The fourth regression (d) in Table 3 indicates that, unlike the U.S. results in Zucker, Darby, and
Brewer (1998) for the U.S., the explanatory factor of the economic variables alone is significantly
greater than that of the intellectual capital variables as a group (compare the log-likelihoods for columns
c and d).  As in the U.S., where and when star scientists are active has a strongly positive and significant
independent effect on where and when biotech-using firms entered into biotechnology, and this effect is
always separate from and in addition to the effects of research support for university scientists and the
general economic conditions of the prefecture.
Thus the Japanese data validate key qualitative conclusions in our previous work for the U.S.
alone on the role of individual star scientists in promoting inception of biotech-using firms in an area and
the regional economic development which they imply.  The local presence of top-producing scientists
contributes to the transformation and expansion of the local industry through organizational change in
incumbent firms in Japan and also through new entrants in America.
IV.  The Science Base and
Organizational Change in Incumbents versus Entry of New Firms
We argued above that even the apparent Japanese entrants born after 1974 are in fact newly
created affiliates of incumbents.  Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we see that the results are essentially the
same whether inceptions include all firms or only those born before 1975.  This is consistent with the
view that all inception of biotechnology in Japan through 1989 occurred by organizational change in
incumbents rather than new entry.  However, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) found that inception
of incumbents and entrants follow a very similar process for the U.S.  Thus the lack of change in
coefficients moving from Table 3 to 4 might simply reflect similar processes governing births of
incumbents and entrants.21
In the following sections, where we examine the effect of keiretsu membership on inception and
compare Japanese to U.S. results, it is appropriate to consider all 368 biotech-using firms in the
statistical analysis.
V.  Has Keiretsu Membership Promoted or Retarded
This Form of Organizational Change?
Keiretsus, large groups of related firms typified by cross-shareholding and financial relations
with a central bank, are generally viewed as a distinctive and important aspect of Japanese industrial
organization.  One hypothesis is that members of a keiretsu are more likely to engage in risky, long-
horizon investments such as biotechnology because of their low cost of capital and implicit risk-sharing
arrangements and superior information network for monitoring innovation.   An alternative hypothesis is
that management of  keiretsu-member firms are more entrenched and less likely to be alert to new
innovations such as biotechnology.  In this section, we examine whether their inception pattern in fact
differs significantly from that estimated for non-member firms.
Since keiretsus are largely informal groupings, there is no generally agreed definition or listing of
which firms are members of which keiretsu.  The situation is somewhat easier for vertical groupings
more analogous to American conglomerates in structure, but it is debatable whether those groups should
be counted as  keiretsus at all.  David  Weinstein generously has provided us with the data set
constructed for  Weinstein and  Yishay  Yafeh (1995) which lists member firms for four different
definitions of keiretsu:  (a) The Big 6 are the DKB, Fuyo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, and Sumitomo
horizontal groups.  (b) The Big 8 are the Big 6 plus the Industrial Bank of Japan and Tokai groups.  (c)
The Big 8 + Vertical definition is the broadest, combining firms that are members of vertical groups and
the Big 8 firms.  (d) The Big 6 Presidents Club definition is the narrowest, including only the inner circle22
of Big 6 firms whose CEOs belong to their group's Presidents Club.
21
Using in turn each of these four definitions of keiretsu memberships, we divided our inception
counts by prefecture and year into the number of inceptions by firms identified as members of a keiretsu
and the number of inceptions by all other firms.  We replicated Table 4 for the member and non-
member counts separately for each definition, and also stacked the two count variables in a third
regression for ease in testing the hypothesis that the coefficients of each of the variables -- but not the
constants -- are the same in each regression pair.
22  We do not include the constant terms in the test as
they will differ simply because keiretsu-member firms are relatively infrequent and thus should (as a
group) have a different, lower base frequency of inception.  For each Keiretsu definition, from broadest
to narrowest, Table 5 reports the c c
2 statistics for these tests of equality for the coefficients of regression
forms (b) through (e) from Table 4 together with a memorandum of the share of  keiretsu-member
inception to total inception into biotechnology.
23  Of the 16 different regression-form and keiretsu-
definition combinations, in only one case does the c c
2 statistic indicate significant differences in regression
coefficients.  This is about what is expected by chance, so we conclude that the keiretsu and non-
keiretsu coefficients are the same.
In Figure 4 we plot the cumulative inception as a percentage of type-specific total inception for
keiretsu members and nonmembers separately.  Note that a higher proportion of  keiretsu members
appear to have entered early in the process than is the case for nonmembers.  Since the underlying
processes are indistinguishable, these differences appear to be explained by subtle differences in
geographical distribution by membership category.
24
VI.  Biotech Adoption and Entry in Japan versus in the United States.
A particularly interesting question is whether the structural differences between Japan and the23
United States result in  detectible differences in the linkage between the science base and its
commercialization.  Since it is difficult to find many  variables which are strictly comparable across
countries, we must address this question with stripped down models which consider only the numbers of
stars and collaborators and total employment in the local area.
25
The first column (a) of Table 6 reports the results from a pooled Japan-US poisson regression
for biotech-using firm inception by year and area based on only a constant and the number of stars and
collaborators in each.  In this simple model, the number of stars but not the number of collaborators has
a significantly positive effect on inceptions of biotech-using firms.  In the remaining four columns of Table
6 we explore different models which include both the values of the variables for both countries and
those values interacted with JDUMMY where JDUMMY is 1 for Japanese observations and 0 for U.S.
observations.  Thus, the interaction terms measure the additional impact of the variable in Japan
compared to the U.S.  Therefore, the combined coefficients for Japanese stars and collaborators in
column (b) are 0.157 + 0.225 = 0.382 and 0.043 - 0.152 = -0.109, respectively.  These differ from
the values in column (a) of Table 4 only because of rounding.
Since on average Japanese prefectures have nearly twice as large populations as American
BEAs, the probability of an inception in a prefecture might well be larger on average than in a BEA, so
we want to test for structural differences that shift the coefficients of the variables in Japan relative to the
coefficients in the U.S.  For an individual coefficient, whether the value of the JDUMMY interaction
coefficient is significantly different from 0 is an appropriate test if it is maintained that all the other
coefficients are in fact different.  The c c
2 JDUMMY interactions = 0 statistic near the bottom of the table
reports the test of the hypothesis that there is no significant difference, except for the constant, in the
inception process between Japan and the U.S. (i.e., that all the coefficients of the interaction terms are
zero).  In contrast to the similar analysis conducted in Section V above for members and non-members
of keiretsus, in every case this c c
2 statistic confirms that there are significant differences between the24
processes in the U.S. and Japan.
26
Considering first the full model in column (e), we see that stars and collaborators have weaker
effects on local developments -- as measured by biotech-using firm inceptions -- in Japan than in the
U.S. and that firms are more likely to enter in Japan where there is already more economic activity. 
This is certainly consistent with the arguments presented in Section II above which suggest that there are
strong structural impediments in Japan to the deep involvement in commercialization characteristic of
many U.S. professors/scientist-entrepreneurs.  The greater importance of agglomeration factors in
Japan, as indicated by the large coefficient on Total Employment x JDUMMY, may also reflect the
institutional structure in which biotech-using firms often get what collaboration they can with star
scientists at national universities by sending their employees to the stars' labs rather than the stars coming
to the firms.  (Recall that in the U.S., it is in both the biotech-using firm's and the scientist's interests for
the university scientist to work at the firm in order to strengthen the case that the university does not
have a property interest in the results of the research.)  If the biotech-using firm's employees are
working in the university lab, rather than vice versa, then it is less important that the biotech-using firm
be located locally to conserve the star's time.
In columns (c) and (d), we see that even in the absence of internationally-comparable additional
university-based measures of intellectual human capital, counts of stars and collaborators and their
interaction alone make a somewhat greater marginal contribution as measured by increases in the log-
likelihood than does total employment in explaining the pattern of inception of biotech-using firms into
biotechnology in Japan and the U.S., with their combined explanatory power considerably greater than
either alone.  This reflects the much greater relative importance of intellectual human capital in the U.S.
as compared to the importance of pre-existing economic geography in Japan.
Figure 5 shows the cumulative densities of Japanese and American biotech-using firm inception,
where each is measured as a cumulative percentage of total inception for each country.
27  The patterns25
are very similar with a relatively small lead on the part of Japan apparently explicable by differences in
definition of the start of the process with inception in Japan definitionally starting in 1975 and in the U.S.
definitionally starting in 1976.  Note, however, in Figure 6 that biotech-using firm inception by non-
members of  keiretsus virtually overlaps the U.S. pattern while inception by  keiretsu members is
concentrated in relatively earlier years.  Again, we cannot determine whether this reflects some anomaly
in reporting practices or whether it is a possible indication of a real timing difference in inception for
keiretsu member firms relative to non-member firms in Japan and firms in the United States.
Given the relatively small coefficients on Japanese stars and collaborators reported in Table 6,
an important issue for future research and for policymakers is whether structural differences in Japan in
comparison with the U.S. have resulted in the under-utilization of the science base -- particularly the
intellectual human capital embodied in the stars and their collaborators -- in terms of its impact on
commercial development in Japan or whether instead these structural differences have only spread the
impact of stars on commercialization more widely throughout Japan. 
VII.  Summary and Conclusions
Times of radical technological change are perilous for incumbent firms -- particularly when that
change originates outside the firms’ technological competencies.  We have seen that incumbent
pharmaceutical firms over the last quarter century have had to adopt biotechnology or die, and that the
bulk of them in fact failed to survive.  This illustrates that biotechnology so improved the performance of
those incumbents and new entrants who could master it that other established firms were no longer able
to compete effectively.
In the U.S. many new entrants emerged and successful incumbents opened or bought facilities
near the academic centers where star scientists worked.  Thus, both organizational change and26
replacement moved the geographic center of the affected industries.  In Japan, we learned that
institutional and geographic factors channeled the industrial transformation due to the biotechnological
revolution almost exclusively into organizational change of incumbent firms.  In the latter half of this
paper we found that Japanese firms -- like their American counterparts -- have been significantly more
likely to adopt biotechnology at a time and place where academic star scientists are actively publishing. 
So in Japan too the location of scientists making breakthrough discoveries has changed the overall
industrial geography as well as the technological identity of particular firms.
This paper raises a number of questions for future research.  Why did less than half of the
American publicly owned pharmaceuticals develop ties to star scientists when they were near necessity
for survival?  Is the absence of new entrants in Japan a major explanation of Japan's lag in
biotechnology relative to the U.S. or can incumbent firms change sufficiently to be equally effective?  Is
the significantly smaller estimated effect of stars on inception in Japan a reflection of relatively less
utilization of the science base or merely that the effect is less geographically concentrated than in the
U.S.?  In the U.S. close ties between academics and firms is symbiotic for science, with stars publishing
significantly more articles which on average are more highly cited during the time they work with firms. 
In Japan this symbiotic process appears to be weaker both in terms of the strength of ties between
Japanese stars and firms and of the impact of those ties on star productivity.  The causality is unclear
and could reflect the smaller resources mobilized for star research in Japanese star-firm ties or the stars’
rational expectations that the payoff will be less and so they are unwilling to become as deeply involved
as is typical in the U.S.
We c onclude that firms can engage in radical organizational change in response to a
technological breakthrough which threatens the survival of firms that cannot improve their performance
to meet the new competitive norms.  Some observers may be more surprised by how many incumbent
succeeded and others more by how many failed.  We have shown that proximity to the very best27
academic scientists whether in an existing facility or through establishment of new facilities is
characteristic of transformation of incumbents in both the U.S. and Japan, basically repeating the pattern
observed for location and timing of new U.S. entrants.  As any coach knows, great strategy can go only
so far in making up for a bench weak in personnel.
Data Appendix
All data on stars and their collaborators was derived from the universe in GenBank (1990), and
hand-pulled and coded records for each of the stars' articles therein as detailed in the Data Appendix to
Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1994), which also provides conceptual and procedural background on the
variables detailed here.
A.1.  Biotechnology-using firms
Attempting to develop a data set comparable to the one we developed for the U.S., we started
by licensing a machine readable data base (North Carolina Biotechnology Center 1992).  As with the
U.S. biotech-using firm data set, we added additional biotech-using firms based on their listings in
Bioscan (1989-1994).  Next, we added additional biotech-using firms from Nikkei Biotechnology
(1990) based on lengthy discussion with Mr. Mitsuru Miyata (Editor-in-Chief) and Ms.  Ikuko
Uchiyama (Staff Editor) of Nikkei Biotechnology which enabled us to distinguish firms actually using
the new technologies from those which were listed as a courtesy to subscribers hoping to improve their
stock price.  Nikkei Biotechnology (1994) was used to fill in missing data.  Finally, we searched each
entry of Nikkei Biotechnology (1990) for firms with research projects or products using recombinant
DNA technology.
As noted, 93.7 percent of these 368 companies had founding dates prior to their inception into28
biotechnology and so were classed as incumbents.  Apparent response bias led a number of early
adopters to report 1975 as the date of inception, which we accepted as the earliest date of inception
even though it is doubtful that inception occurred before 1976 given the lag observed in applying the key
Cohen-Boyer discovery (Stanley Cohen, A. Chang, Herbert Boyer, and R. Helling 1973) in the U.S. 
In four cases, very early incumbent adopters gave dates of inception before 1975, apparently referring
to earlier technologies; these were constrained to 1975.
28  This gave us dates of inception for 333 firms.
 For another 35 firms, no inception dates were available in any of our data sources.   Since there was
valuable location data associated with the firms, we estimated the inception date of these firms by
drawing inception dates from the same distribution as recorded for firms in their prefecture with known
inception dates.
Typically, these biotech-using firms were large enterprises with many locations and often the
headquarters address was listed as the biotech-using firm's location regardless of where biotechnology
actually was being applied.  Akio Tagawa developed an ingenious method to locate biotech-using firms
by searching the Science Citation Index online by firm name for 1983-1993 to see where scientists
affiliated with each firm were writing bioscience articles.  For those firms which could be thus located,
the most frequent location was designated the site of inception.  Otherwise, the listed location was
retained.
A.2.  Japanese University Research Resources
Our university research resources information is taken from a comprehensive directory
published by the Japan Association for the Advancement of Science (Nihon  Gakujutsu  Shinkokai,
1990) which has listings for all of the scientific research institutions in Japan affiliated to universities.  This
source, in addition to general information such as institute names, addresses, phone numbers, and year
of establishment, also contains very detailed information such as director names, numbers of29
researchers, research divisions within institutions, researcher names, research objectives, and
information about research oriented resources.  It is published yearly.
We first collected information from this directory about all of the research institutes that perform
research in bioscience related fields, and compiled them.  In particular, the numbers of full professors,
associate professors, assistant professors, and other researchers, as well as the total resources for each
relevant institute was recorded.
The relative size and structure of Japanese research institutes is quite clear from the way in
which the entries are listed.  Institutes generally are broken down into smaller research divisions, each of
which has a specific research agenda, and each of which is led by what we call a "main professor," who
is usually a full professor but often an associate professor.  Thus, the number of main professors or
research divisions gives us a very good indicator of how large the universities' institutes are.  Typically, it
would suffice to simply count the number of full professors who are affiliated to each institute, but in
many cases, there was no full professor, and so an associate professor was counted.   It is for this
reason that we have used a variable No. Main Professors which counts their number by prefecture, in
contrast to simply using "full" professor.
We also collected information about the total amount of yearly resources for each of the
relevant institutes.  This figure also is another measure of the relative size of the institutions.  Because we
were concentrating on relative size of the institutions based on university and ultimately location of the
university by prefecture, we collected the information for the research institutes from the 1990 directory,
which includes information for the years 1987 and 1988.
In the end, all of the data was combined and sorted based on the universities to which the
various research institutes belong, and the cumulative data is what we used for this study.  Because we
were only interested in the top research oriented universities in the country, we used a minimum cut-off
of three main professors per university to qualify for the analysis, and all others were considered too30
small to significantly contribute.  Our variable Total Research Funding is the sum (in millions of yen)
across all such universities in a given prefecture.
Note that both No. Main Professors and Total Research Funding have the same values for a
given prefecture for each year in the analysis, thus serving together as a type of modeled fixed effect
component in our regressions.
A.3.  Japanese Economic Variables
The main prefecture-level economic variables used are Total Employment (total employment in
the given prefecture in a given year) and Average Earnings (average earnings per employed person in
the given prefecture in a given year).  These variables were obtained for the years 1975-1990.  At the
sub-national level, we combined several sources to compile the necessary information for these
variables:  Policy Planning and Research Department, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of  Labour
(1975-1990), Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991),
Asahi Shinbunsha (1975-1990), Kokuseisha (1988), and Bureau of Statistics (1991).
Total Employment (in thousands) was listed irregularly in the various sources, and while there
was some overlap among sources which served for confirmational purposes, much of the information
was obtained through the above sources in different editions.  In the end, we were able to obtain
consistent data only for the years 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1987, and 1990.  The remaining
years were filled in by interpolation from the obtained data.
Average Earnings was calculated from the average cash earnings per worker per month over a
twelve month period for all of the 47 prefectures in Japan and compared for consistency to the national
average.  Cash earnings is defined as the amount of money earned before deductions for income tax, for
social insurance contributions, for union dues, and for payment for goods purchased.  Cash earnings
specifically include semi-annual bonuses, which in Japan are (or were) typically equivalent to another six31
months' worth of income.  The yearly cash earnings were divided by 12 to find the average monthly
cash earnings for each prefecture and year.  Finally, we adjusted this amount for inflation by dividing by
the consumer price index for the central city of each of the prefectures in Japan for each year during the
period 1975-1990.  The basic cash earnings data were found in successive annual editions of the
Yearbook of Labour Statistics during this period.
We also experimented with a third economic variable, the Earnings/Price Ratio as an estimate of
the (all-equity) cost of capital.  This figure is the inverse of the price/earnings ratio as reported in Nihon
Ginko Tokeikyoku (1975-1990) for the Tokyo Stock Price Index, or TOPIX, based on all First
Section stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.32
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1. Evidence of geographically localized knowledge, often attributed to knowledge spillovers, is reported
by Adam B.  Jaffe 1989,  Jaffe, Manuel  Trajtenberg, and Rebecca Henderson 1993, and Edwin
Mansfield 1995, Lynne G. Zucker, Michael R. Darby, and Marilynn B. Brewer 1998, and Zucker,
Darby, and Jeff Armstrong 1998.
2. This requirement excludes firms that specialize in low-cost manufacturing of generic versions of drugs
discovered by other firms once their patents have expired.
3. These models were estimated using LIMDEP, Version 7.0.
4. The 18 firms counted as surviving include not only the Upjohn case of an equal merger but also the
two Swiss companies that consummated an equal merger to form Norvartis.  Even if we reduce the
population reduced to 17 firms after excluding the equal mergers, we can reject the hypothesis that
survival does not depend on adopting biotechnology at the 0.05 level.
5. As quoted in Clive Cookson (1995).  Cookson reports that "[t]oday, genetic engineering is used
daily as a laboratory tool by every research-based pharmaceutical and biotech company."
6. Each genetic sequence entering GenBank for the first time is assigned a primary accession number
(our measure of a genetic-sequence discovery).
7. A number of respondents report that even apparent "venture firm" entrants in our data set (e.g.,
Hayashibara Biochemical and Nippon Gene) are more accurately characterized as continuations of and
subunits of long existing family firms which provided their financing rather than new dedicated
biotechnology firms comparable to the usual American form.8. Prefectures are 92 percent larger than BEAs in population but only 16 percent as large in land area,
although some of the latter discrepancy is eliminated if the few BEAs comprising Alaska and the desert
southwest are excluded from the U.S. calculations.
9. The decision is made by a faculty committee.  If the patent is not assigned to the professor(s) it goes
to the government in which case the Ministry of Finance does not return any income to the university or
department.
10. Copublication is generally agreed by scientists and executives to be an excellent indicator of
alignment of interests and was shown in Section I to be an important predictor of incumbent firm
success.  Similarly, Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998) show that copublication with stars is a
powerful determinant of (primarily entrant) firm success in California.  Zucker and Darby (1999)
compare the frequency of star-firm ties across a number of countries.
11. These firms are sometimes involved with financing start-ups abroad as discussed below.
12. An alternative view of the Japanese situation is that the lack of start-up funding does not reflect
incompleteness of the capital markets.  Such funding vehicles, on this view, are not necessary in Japan
because the keiretsu provide an efficient funding mechanism for new activities in a way which reduces
shareholder-manager agency problems.  On this view, the numerous American venture capital firms are
due to American regulatory restrictions.  We do not believe that this story holds up, however, since the
banking regulatory system in Japan is even more restrictive than in the United States, there are no
regulations preventing large American firms from establishing new sub-units to pursue new technologies,
and venture capital firms funding startups was also a feature of the incubation of the U.S. electronics
industry for which there were no significant liability issues (see footnote 6 above).13. JASDAQ suffered from some early scandals which may have reinforced caution in standards for
IPOs.
14. Stock prices of the major conglomerates do seem to react to the reputed success of their biotech
subunits.  On the other hand even remarkably profitable biotech-using subunits tend to be small relative
to the core businesses of their parents.  For example, Kirin Brewery reportedly earned ¥23 billion in
1993 on two very successful pharmaceutical products, but stock prices declined with overall sales of
beer.  Given the results in Section I above, these biotech subunits may play a vital role in determining a
firm's long-run success as the Japanese economy transforms from medium- to high-tech production in
the face of new competition in the globalized economy.  Accordingly, we are puzzled by the general
belief by Japanese experts that the value of such subunits would not get reflected in competitive bids for
successful bio-ventures.
15. Recall, however, that Japanese industrialists appear to prefer dealing with American academic
researchers so there may be significant elements of the cost-benefit relationship omitted from the simple
cost comparison.
16. Note that the two university systems are similar in their reliance on an initial screening period
followed by lifetime tenure guaranteed by the university.  However, the practice appears to be different.
 U.S. faculty more often move -- with life tenure -- to other universities, and more often will resign
tenured university employment for untenured opportunities in firms or research institutes.  Perhaps
significantly, in America only tenured university professors can take a leave of absence -- rather than
being forced to resign previous employment -- when they accept appointment as an official of the
federal government.17. Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998) present some evidence that entrants may be more successful
in biotech research than incumbents.
18. In empirical work not reported in detail here, we tried an alternative definition of inception based on
both the primary locations and any additional secondary locations where biotech-relevant research was
reported.  The results were substantially similar, but more difficult to interpret since we had to supply
missing inception years for all the secondary locations.
19. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) also included a count of the number of venture capital firms in
the BEA eligible to finance start-up entrants, but such a variable would be uniformly 0 in Japan during
this period.  In addition, we experimented in regressions not reported here with the (TOPIX) earnings-
price ratio as a measure of the nationwide cost of capital.  This variable performed even more poorly
than in the U.S. case (see Zucker, Darby, and Brewer 1998) with perverse (positive) coefficients
wherever it was entered.  We believe that this occurred because, varying by year but not prefecture, it
serves as a fixed effects proxy for the year and, in our sample, covaried positively with underlying
factors impacting positively on biotech-using firm inception.  It is frequently argued that the managers of
Japanese firms are so insulated from stock-market pressure that the absence of a significant negative
effect is not entirely surprising.
20. Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) report that both stars and collaborators have positive effects in
the corresponding model for the U.S.  Differences between the U.S. and Japan will be explored in
Section VI below.  Note, however, that in long-run poisson regressions (not feasible here because of
the smaller number of prefectures than U.S. BEAs) Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) do find some
evidence of negative effects of the number of active collaborators.21. The two broader definitions (b) and (c) were based on "Dodwell Marketing Consultants' Industrial
Groupings in Japan."  The narrower definitions (a) and (d) were based on " Keizai Chosa Kyokai's
Keiretsu no Kenkyu (KNK)."  (Weinstein and Yishay Yafeh 1995, p. 367.)
22. See Section VI below for details on the stacked regressions and associated Wald test as the
technique is applied to testing for equality of coefficients for inception in Japan and the U.S.
23. These stacked regressions are not reported in full since the coefficient estimates are identical to
those in the separate regressions, representative examples of which are reported in Table 5 below.
24. Alternatively, the differences which are visually apparent may not be statistically significantly so. 
Further, these differences may reflect remaining differential reporting bias in which larger firms are more
likely to claim to have been doing biotechnology from the beginning since nearly 10 percent of keiretsu
firms report entering biotechnology in the earliest possible year.
25. In the United States we use functional economic areas (BEAs) as the local areas corresponding to
prefectures in Japan.
26. The c c
2 statistic is not reported for column (d) since in that case there is only one interaction term
and the significant coefficient for Total Employment x JDUMMY is sufficient to demonstrate structural
differences.
27. There are a relatively small number of incumbents in the U.S. for which secondary locations are
included among the biotech-using firms if separate inception dates could be obtained for inception at
each location.
28. Inception dates for incumbents are generally less reliable than for entrants, and this is especially so in41
Japan where many firms declare themselves early adopters of biotechnology referring to older
fermentation and other production methods based on living organisms, and not to the "new"
biotechnology based on recombinant DNA, monoclonal antibodies, and other new techniques.
</ref_section>42
Table 1
Adoption of Biotechnology and Survival to 1999 of Publicly Traded Companies with
A.  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association Membership in 1975 (38 Firms)
        Indicator of Adoption       All Firms  Test for = exit rates
   No Star Ties   Had Star Ties
a
Firm Did Not Survive   19    3   22     -
Firm Survived
b to 1999    4   12   16     -
All Firms   23   15   38     -
Exit rate (2-year publication lag) 3.92% 1.56% 3.25%     
 z=1.558, p=0.060
c
Exit rate (0-year publication lag) 3.69% 1.85% 3.25%     
 z=1.150, p=0.125
c
Contingency table  c c
2(1) = 14.6  (p < 0.001)
B.  World's Leading Companies in the Development of New Drugs in 1981-1982 (20 Firms)
        Indicator of Adoption       All Firms  Test for = exit rates
   No Star Ties   Had Star Ties
a
Firm Did Not Survive    2    0    2     -
Firm Survived
b to 1999    4   14   18     -
All Firms    6   14   20     -
Exit rate (2-year publication lag) 1.13% 0.00% 0.57%     
 z=1.414, p=0.078
c
Exit rate (0-year publication lag) 0.98% 0.00% 0.57%     
 z=1.212, p=0.113
c
Contingency table  c c
2(1) = 5.2  (p < 0.025)
Note:
a
Had star ties indicates that one or more genetic-sequence-discovery articles was written by a star scientist with or as an employee
of the listed firm or a predecessor or controlled firm.
b
Survived means that the firm continued to 1999 as an independent firm (or division or subsidiary of the 1975 parent) or the
dominant or equal partner in any merger.
c
z and p values of one-sided test of hypothesis that exit is binomial process independent of ties.
Sources:  A.  Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association, 1975 membership list; COMPUSTAT, CRSP; Securities Data Corporation Mergers and
Acquisition data base; Bioscan various issues; world wide web company web pages.  B.  California Department of Commerce
(1986), Tables 11 and 12; COMPUSTAT, CRSP; Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisition data base;  Bioscan
various issues; world wide web company web pages.43
Table 2
Effect of Adoption of Biotechnology on Survival
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association Membership in 1975 (38 Firms)
Weibull Loglinear Survival Models
Variables                 Coefficients (standard errors)              
  2-year publication lag     0-year publication lag 
Constant   2.967***  2.828***  3.001***  2.852***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107)
Has-ties  0.815**  0.644*  0.743*  0.578*
(0.297) (0.281) (0.293) (0.280)
Top-20    -  1.039*    -  1.062*
(0.460) (0.462)
Sigma  0.451***  0.435***  0.451***  0.437***
(0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.086)
Log-likelihood -88.35 -82.78 -89.51 -83.62
Significance level:  *p < 0.05,  **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.00144
Table 3
Poisson Regressions for Inception of Use of Biotechnology by 345 Incumbent Firms
by Year and Prefecture in Japan, 1975-1989
  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)
Constant   -1.049*** -1.158*** -1.479*** -4.112*** -5.975***
(0.040) (0.043) (0.060) (0.621) (0.584)
Active Stars      0.388***  0.405***  0.167***    -    0.108***
  (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)     (0.028)
Active   -0.111*** -0.003 -0.045**    - -0.088***
  Collaborators (0.014) (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.023)
 
Active Stars x        - -0.008*** -0.003*    - -0.001
  Active Collabs.    -  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of Main           -    -   -0.086***    - 0.024
  Professors   (0.008)  (0.014)
 
Total Research    -    - -0.023***    - -0.003
  Funding-University (0.001)  (0.003)
  
Total Employ-    -    -    -  0.563***  0.479***
  ment in Prefecture (0.066) (0.075)
   
Average Earnings    -    -    -  0.058**  0.110***
  in Prefecture (0.019) (0.017)
  
  
Log-likelihood -671.4 -658.3 -586.7 -531.9 -509.0
Log-likel. restricted -869.3 -869.3 -869.3 -869.3 -869.3
Significance levels:  * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted by  Wooldridge 1991, Procedure 2.1) are in parentheses below
coefficients.  N = 705.45
Table 4
Poisson Regressions for Inception of Use of Biotechnology by 345 Incumbent and 23 Entrant
Firms, by Year and Prefecture in Japan, 1975-1989
  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d)   (e)
Constant   -0.962***  -1.059*** -1.364*** -3.901*** -5.661***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.055) (0.580) (0.552)
Active Stars      0.383***  0.398***  0.168***    -    0.108***
  (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.026)
Active   -0.109*** -0.010 -0.051**    - -0.093***
  Collaborators (0.013) (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.023)
 
Active Stars x        - -0.008*** -0.002    - -0.0002
  Active Collabs.     (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of Main           -    -   -0.084***    - 0.026**
  Professors    (0.007)  (0.013)
 
Total Research    -    - -0.022***    - -0.004
  Funding-University (0.001)  (0.003)
Total Employ-    -    -    -  0.560***  0.473***
  ment in Prefecture (0.061) (0.071)
Average Earnings    -    -    - 0.055** 0.105***
   in Prefecture (0.018) (0.017)
  
  
Log-likelihood -711.3 -699.8 -628.1 -567.2 -544.5
Log-likel. restricted -915.5 -915.5 -915.5 -915.5 -915.5
Significance levels:  * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted by  Wooldridge 1991, Procedure 2.1) are in parentheses below
coefficients.  N = 705.46
Table 5
Wald Tests for Equality of Coefficients for
Inception of Use of Biotechnology by 368 Keiretsu and Non-Keiretsu Members
in Poisson Regressions by Year and Prefecture in Japan, 1975-1989
Variables Included --          c c
2 Statistics
a by Definition of Keiretsu
b        
Equality of Coefficients Big 8 + Big 8 Big 6 Big 6
Tested Groupwise
a Vertical Pres. Club
Active Stars, Active    2.24   2.60   3.30   5.54
Collaborators, Active Stars   [3]   [3]   [3]   [3]
x Active Collaborators.
Above variables + No. of    7.60   8.62   7.59  9.71
Main Professors, Total   [5]   [5]   [5]   [5]
Research Funding-University
Above variables + Total  10.56  12.81   9.76  16.48*
Employment, Average    [7]   [7]   [7]   [7]
Earnings in Prefecture
Only Total Employment in   1.05   1.36   3.65   3.70
Prefecture, Average    [2]   [2]   [2]   [2]
Earnings in Prefecture
Memo: Share of Keiretsu-   0.307   0.291   0.293   0.139
Members in Total Entry
Significance levels:  * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
Notes:
aThe reported statistics are distributed c c
2 with the degrees of freedom reported below each in
square brackets on the null hypothesis that the coefficient for each variable is the same for entry
of keiretsu-member and non-member firms in poisson regressions in which the number of births
of each type are counted separately.
bKeiretsu membership is defined by comparing our firms with those listed as in a keiretsu of a
particular type for four different definitions in a data set generously supplied by David E.
Weinstein and described in Weinstein and Yishay Yafeh (1995).  The Big 6 are the DKB,
Fuyo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, and Sumitomo horizontal groups.  The Big 8 are the Big 6 plus
the Industrial Bank of Japan and Tokai groups.  The Big 8 + Vertical definition adds firms that
are members of vertical groups.  The Big 6 Presidents Club definition is the narrowest, including
only Big 6 firms whose CEOs belong to their group's Presidents Club.47
Table 6
Poisson Regressions for Inception of Use of Biotechnology by Incumbent and Entrant Firms
by Year and Local Area in Japan (1975-1989) and the U.S. (1976-1989)
   (a)    (b)    (c)    (d)    (e)
Constant -1.414*** -1.591*** -1.858*** -1.793*** -1.971***
(0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.047)
JDUMMY    -  0.629***  0.799*** -0.344*** -0.152
(0.054) (0.064) (0.068) (0.092)
Active Stars  0.204***  0.157***  0.250***    -  0.147***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.024)
Active Stars x    -  0.225***  0.148***    - -0.057
  JDUMMY (0.032) (0.027) (0.035)
Active Collaborators  0.011  0.043**  0.229***    -  0.208***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Active Collaborators    - -0.152*** -0.239***    - -0.222***
  x JDUMMY (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Active Stars x    -    - -0.014***    - -0.011***
  Active Collaborators (0.001) (0.001)
Active Stars x Active     -    - 0.007**    - 0.007***
  Collabs. x JDUMMY (0.002) (0.002)
Total Employment    -    -    -  0.431***  0.183***
  in area (0.010) (0.028)
Total Employment    -    -    -  0.300***  0.526***
  x JDUMMY (0.022) (0.044)
c c
2 JDUMMY   n/a  71.9*** 185.2***  n/a 375.4***
interactions=0   [2]   [3]   [4]
Log-likelihood -2474.0 -2388.2 -2162.4 -2316.4 -1973.4
Log-likel. restricted -3192.0 -3192.0 -3192.0 -3192.0 -3192.0
Significance levels:  * < 0.05, ** < 0.01, *** < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors (adjusted by  Wooldridge 1991, Procedure 2.1) are in parentheses below
coefficients.  N = 3220.
Degrees of freedom are in brackets under the c c
2 statistics.
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